As part of the strategic shift from employing 'hard' to 'soft' power, states have increasingly used sport in general and sports mega-events (SMEs) in particular. The latter are often used as broad-brush diplomatic tools to increase a state's international prestige, improve an often tarnished image and increase the likelihood of the bidding state's acceptance on the world stage, drawing on two sports-related examples to exemplify the utility of the ideal type.
SMEs are seen by the majority of regime types as part of their wider diplomatic armoury and by their very nature these events cut across all of the areas identified by the authors which are considered important for generating soft power. This is significant, as current debates tend to focus on semantics or fail to engage with the concept, rather than providing a conceptual framework with which to attempt to understand a state's soft power strategy. As such the authors refrain from confronting many of Nye's conceptual limitations while providing the rationale for their research methods and sources used in developing the analysis. In introducing an ideal type, flesh is added to the theoretical bones of much of this debate by highlighting the mechanisms national governments and relevant stakeholders draw on to acquire soft power. To illustrate its potential two real-life test-cases are provided: Germany's hosting of the 2006 FIFA World Cup and Qatar's sport diplomacy, including the acquisition of the 2022 FIFA World Cup. 3 The possible pitfalls of any soft power strategy are also highlighted before concluding how this ideal type might be used in future research to help further identify and explain the mechanisms through which a state can acquire soft power for diplomatic purposes.
'Soft Power': concept, debate and limitations
The concept of 'soft power' was coined in 1990 by the American political scientist, Joseph Nye. For Nye, the 'power' side of the concept denotes one's ability to 'effect the outcomes you want, and, if necessary, to change the behaviour of others to make this happen'. 4 For twenty-first century leaders, Nye suggests political outcomes can be achieved through an amalgamation of both 'hard' and 'soft' power strategies. 5 On the one hand, states may draw upon forms of 'hard power', through, for example, capitalizing on military force or offering economic rewards; on the other, they may choose to indirectly adapt the political agenda in such a way which shapes the preferences of others through, for instance, emulating one's 'intangible assets': attractive culture, innovative ideologies, and/or credible and commendable institutions, values and policies. 6 It is this latter approach which Nye calls 'soft power': 'the ability to achieve goals through attraction rather than coercion'. 7 Such attraction converts into power outcomes when those on the receiving end of the soft power strategy look to the state producing it for affirmation, guidance and leadership, or seek to imitate their domestic and/or international achievements. 8 This is, however, not to suggest that soft power should replace the utilization of hard power -in-fact national leaders should, whenever possible, endeavour to combine the soft dimension of attraction with the hard dimensions of coercion and inducement (what Nye terms 'smart power'). 9 Rather, Nye advocates that nation-states should take greater advantage of the former. 10 Nye's rationale for this is three fold. First, since the end of the Cold War nation-states have become far more concerned with forms of welfare over military glory, whereby in the modern era national leaders need greater public support before engaging in forceful pursuits. 11 Second, for the majority of states, the use of force severely jeopardizes their economic objectives and ability to maintain international competitiveness. 12 Finally, the increasing influence of the information revolution and globalization has led to states' behaviour coming under closer scrutiny than ever before. The result is that the use of force has become less tolerated in post-industrial (and, in particular, advanced capitalist) societies, leading to the increasing importance of soft forms of power. 45 In most cases, hosting a successful SME is thought to lead to enhanced soft power that can make a state's culture and political values more attractive to others, thus improving the image or 'brand' of the host and/or signalling their emerging status as a key international actor. 46 In short, sport is no longer just a niche cultural institution for national governments to consider employing domestically, but rather a highly relevant foreign policy tool. 47 One could be forgiven for presuming that with the quantity of commentators making use of Nye's concept -across the four groups outlined -an excellent heuristic device with which to help explain how and why states engage in the 'politics of attraction' on the international stage would have been developed. Unfortunately, although the concept has shed some light on why states undertake a soft power strategy (for international prestige/increased trade etc.), little has been discussed on the 'how'. Indeed, despite its growing significance, many have strongly criticized Nye's work. 48 Through these authors' attempts to unpick, understand and extend soft power theoretically, Nye's original concept has been, and, more importantly, continues to be, questioned on four specific levels: first, many have raised concerns over what soft power actually is, and, more specifically, whether it is merely another buzzword for conceptualizing that of nation branding and/or place marketing; 49 second, many have suggested that Nye fails to deliver a clear description of how one actually acquires 'soft power' or forms of attraction, leading to the concept becoming highly confusing and problematic to work with; 50 third, due to Nye's reliance on discussions of the West, many equate soft power as being either too structural or Western-centric; 51 and finally, some have argued that greater academic attention is needed in identifying and highlighting the potential pitfalls for any state that attempts to acquire soft power forms.
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In responding to the first criticism above, Nye himself -along with others -has been quick to remind us that soft power should not merely be considered another term for place marketing/nation branding. 53 As Nye has been at pains to advocate, soft power is not simply the ability to persuade; it is the ability to entice and attract, leading to acquiescence and imitation. Considering this, if a state's culture, values and/or policies are not themselves authentically attractive, no soft power outcomes will be gained; 54 soft power cannot be achieved through slick marketing and/or branding, but emanates from, above all else, credibility -a value which simple propaganda and/or public relations campaigns often lack. 55 In agreement with Nye, we would argue that although selling a positive image of oneself is a significant part of public diplomacy, for soft power to work, leaders need to, first-andforemost, build long-term relationships based on trust and credibility, eventually leading to an enabling environment for effective government policies. Given this, the authors agree with
Nye that soft power aligns itself more to public diplomacy than nation building and/or place marketing; 56 identify the universal applicability of soft power.
Methods
The ideal-type put-forward is derived from empirical work conducted over a four year period by the authors with national authorities in Europe, South America and the Middle East. 58 In addition, the authors have generated knowledge as part of a multi-state research project on the leveraging strategies adopted by countries hosting mega-events in an attempt to produce tangible 'legacies', including, amongst others, showcasing their nation, improving their national image and putting themselves on the international map. 59 The following is indicative of the range of sources drawn upon which fed into the development of the idea type. Both studies of Germany and Qatar have been published in full elsewhere (see endnote 3). The second stage of our data collection strategy included semi-structured interviews with key officials in Germany and the State of Qatar between 2011 and 2015. The ability of semi-structured interviews to produce the most in-depth accounts of specific phenomena, as well as combine the flexibility of unstructured techniques with more focused, structured-like forms, led to the decision to use this form of interviewing. 61 Key organizations and personnel were chosen in line with the study's aims and objectives (see Table 2 ) 62 and all participants were required to be over the age of 18 years old. Participant must be over 18 years of age.
Table 2: Interview Inclusion Criterion
As shown in Table 3 Data was subjected to a thorough thematic analysis through first, reading and rereading of documents and transcribed interviews; second, generating 'initial codes' which identified parts of the data found most significant; third, identifying the various relationships that existed between these initial codes, which allowed the authors to begin the process of creating overarching themes; fourth, the themes were then re-worked until each theme was distinctive in its own right. Following this stage the authors then re-consulted the literature and concluded the analysis by assigning a name to our themes which captured the overall 'story' each was telling.
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A central part of the contribution is the development of an ideal type of soft power that will be of use to both academics and practitioners alike. An ideal type is, of course, a construct that represents an intellectual description of a phenomenon in its abstract form and does not provide us with explanations. What follows should not be understood as an 'ideal' standard 'in the sense of being perfect, but rather that it is "ideal" in the sense of being an intellectual construct that may never exist in the real world'. 64 Rather, an ideal type is a conceptualisation with which the researcher can compare reality on the ground (empirical evidence). Ideal types are thus hypothetical constructs formed by emphasising aspects of behaviour and institutions which are (generally) empirically observable. These constructs isolate 'those variables central to the study of a problem, putting aside those aspects of the reality which seem inessential to the analysis'. 65 This ideal type has been developed through an iterative process between concepts and empirical data across a number of cases, as stated above, including non-Western states (Brazil, Qatar, Russia) and Western states (UK, Germany, Canada). Two key points ought to be noted at this juncture: first, the purpose of an ideal type is to be parsimonious. By definition this will mean that there will be a number of aspects that are not included in our model; second, our purpose is not to advance a 'theory' of soft power or an explanatory framework for predicting outcomes, but rather to produce a tool that can be used and adapted by researchers looking at a variety of states and their soft power strategies.
Towards an 'Ideal Type' of a States' Soft Power Package
The ideal type of soft power and the domains within which they are likely to be found are revealed from the two 'test cases' 66 -one actual SME (FIFA 2006 World Cup) and one longer-term sports diplomatic strategy (by Qatar) -drawn from sport for two, simple reasons.
First, sport is an under-researched yet fruitful area for soft power/diplomacy research; both political science and international relations as disciplines are bereft of in-depth studies using sport/sporting events as part of a nation's soft power strategy. 67 Some slow progress has been made since Taylor suggested in 1986 that IR and sport suffer from a case of 'mutual neglect'. 68 Sports studies literature more broadly has begun to engage with the political and diplomatic use of sport. SMEs, in particular, are considered as significant soft power opportunities, acting as major contributions in the process of improving their nation's image, profiling and showcasing themselves globally and 'attracting' others. 69 International sporting success, whether by athletic competition or by the effective staging of SMEs, is said to provide the perfect opportunity for states who seek to 'attract' others with their values and culture and persuade them to want what they want by projecting specific images, principles, achievements and visions to foreign publics. 70 The second key reason why sporting test cases were chosen is that sport and sports events play a role in all five of the (interlinked) 'resources' that appear essential in a state's successful soft power strategy (see figure) . First, is the resource of 'Culture' -to which Diplomacy is a broad resource that entails formal state-to-state relations, but also encompasses the multitude of actors now involved in diplomatic relations. Public diplomacy studies differentiate between the 'old' modus operandi via 'hierarchical state-centric structures' on the one hand and the 'new' model of a 'network environment' in which several actors, of which the state is but one, undertake public diplomacy. 74 The role of non-state actors in the burgeoning area of a 'sports' diplomacy -that is, both the use of sport to achieve diplomatic ends, but also the more prominent role of the International Olympic Committee and other international non-governmental organisations -is greatly increasing. Whereas a few well-known examples of sport being used as an 'ice-breaker' in diplomatic affairs are regularly cited (e.g. the 'ping-pong' diplomacy between the US and China), a wide range of regime types are now signing up to host a SME to signal their arrival on the world stage. Taken together, the five domains highlighted above constitute the areas within which states attempt to gain soft power. Clearly, some of the components of the ideal type above are relatively constant, for example, 'art', 'language', 'national identity' and 'values and morals'.
Other components can be stimulated by key events, such as an SME. The latter can kick-start tourism, impact diplomatic relations and affect trade relations. Any success in these areas then becomes part of the nation's 'branding'. Australia, for example, understands and brands itself as a 'sporting nation', despite the fact that they suffer high levels of obesity. The
Australian Tourist Commission suggested that the Sydney Olympics in 2000 'accelerated development of brand Australia by 10 years'. 75 Of interest to the discussion here is that Germany to be seen as a nation of culture ('Kulturnation') and its people to be known for more than just being 'punctual, reliable and disciplined'. 79 The German strategy resulted in a long-term, carefully planned, coordinated and implemented set of actions designed to change the national 'image' of Germany among foreign publics. The 'strategies' in figure 2 take place in the resources identified in the soft power ideal type: the cultural augmentation strategy greatly increased the international scope of Germany's World Cup through showing projects in 40 different countries and 87 different international cities. 80 According to Green 81 such 'augmentation' -that is, putting on activities, entertainment and services over and beyond the event itself -enhances and broadens the appeal of an event. In preparation to receive tourists, a number of campaigns were specifically designed to prepare Germany and the Germans to be hospitable to the crowds of foreign visitors that were expected for the competition. 82 One of the latter was the 'Nation-wide Service and Hospitality Campaign' which held some 430 for 6, 500 service employees (bus, tram and taxi drivers, service personnel at airports, train stations, information offices etc.) to prepare them for foreign visitors.. 83 The tourism industry seems to have benefitted from the four-week tournament, for a poll conducted during the tournament revealed that 90% of visitors would recommend Germany as a holiday destination. 84 The 'Branding' resource was headed up by the 'Land of Ideas' campaign, launched in 2006 and designed to improve the German national image by showcasing Germany and attracting tourism and foreign investment. It was so successful that it continues to this day, bringing together key actors from business, science and culture, and facilitating the promotion of Germany's image externally. million euros. 88 While it is notoriously difficult to find accurate data on the exact economic impact of the FWC on a nation's economy, half of the companies who reported a positive 'FWC' effect on their business thought the gain in reputation of Germany and its products was 'the underlying reason for the economic success of this mega event'. 89 This 'reputational gain', while hard to calculate, is clearly part of a successful soft power strategy.
It is clear that the above 'resources' identified overlap: an augmentation plan involving arts, heritage and history is designed to attract tourists ('Tourism' resource) and to get them to stay longer and spend more money ('Trade'). It also greatly adds to the 'Branding' resource -Germany's cultural history as the 'land of poets and thinkers' helps sell it as a tourist destination. Equally, part of the reason Germany's soft power strategy worked well was because of wealth: hardly any resources were spent on 'infrastructure' (building roads, transport systems, stadia), as these were already present and at a very high standard.
Thus, resources could be re-directed into the type of campaigns discussed here.
Qatar's Soft Power Ambitions through Sport Diplomacy
Applying the ideal type to the case of Qatar reveals its soft power strategy via sport diplomacy. Due to its abundance of wealth, predominantly from the sale of crude oil and liquefied natural gas, Qatar is able to invest heavily in the acquisition of soft power through sports diplomacy. Qatar's nominal GDP per capita is almost double that of Germany's (US$93,965 compared to roughly US$47,589) 90 and, relative to many states, a substantial proportion of this wealth has been invested in various sporting endeavours. 91 Based on the authors' various engagements with Qatari authorities and relevant documents, the argument is that Qatar's soft power objectives through sport rest upon the mechanisms of culture, tourism, branding, diplomacy and trade (see figure 3 ). It should be noted, however, that as Qatar's engagements with global sport are fairly recent, the actual soft power outcomes have yet to fully materialize, and, therefore, the paper offers only the intended outcomes that
Qatari authorities seek to achieve. Investments also purchased the French Ligue 1 television rights; broadcasting under the name 'beIN Sports', the network now holds the rights to transmit live sport in 'Hong Kong, the US, Canada, Australia and Indonesia'. 102 Finally Qatari Diar purchased a large part of the London 2012 Olympic Village, now known as 'East Village'. Qatari Diar, the real-estate wing of the Qatar Investment Authority, purchased the land in 2011 and is, along with other major stakeholders, Delancey, transforming the complex into luxury housing. 103 Apart from the obvious long-term financial investment the state wishes to recoup, such projects also look to demonstrate Qatar's acumen in the areas of business, finance and real-estate.
Taken together, Qatar draws strongly on all five areas identified in the idea type with the express purpose of improving its standing on the international stage. As is well documented, the hosting of a sports event as part of this strategy can also backfire: by inviting the amount of media attention that a global sporting event attracts, a state is challenging insatiable 24 hour media to scrutinize its modus operandi. In Germany's case the global media witnessed a well-run, carnivalesque festival of sport enjoyed by a variety of cultures with very few problems; Qatar, however, has had an avalanche of poor media coverage around its dealings with foreign construction workers and the extraordinary employer-employee relations that exist.
Conclusion
Clearly further research is needed to develop the ideal type of soft power put forward in this paper. However, the attempt has been made to partially fill a major gap in the literature by offering a start to the debate on grounding soft power in empirical research. Yet, it is clear that these areas overlap and several institutions -for example, the Foreign Office in the UK -seek to promote all in the work that they, and their sponsored organisations do. The significance of the article lies in the attempt to spell out soft power resources, which then allow researchers and policy makers to consider the potential gains and draw-backs of strategies designed to win over opinion abroad and make states more attractive to others. Such an ideal type is useful as a starting point in understanding how and why states seek to influence others using sport diplomacy and SMEs. It is clear that not all states seek a soft power strategy as put forward in this article. Some, like Russia, for example, confound the standard rationale and do not fit the ideal type. Rather than rendering the ideal type problematic, such 'outliers' can be understood better, if researchers know in which way they differ from the mainstream. 104 Debates on and around the empirical aspects of 'soft power' are to be encouraged and it is hoped that this article has been able to persuade scholars of the
